We present a framework of group cooperation and competition in which agents are concerned not only about their material payoffs but also about their psychological payoffs, derived from working with others per se. In such a framework, a group"s psychological preferences serve to enhance the group"s material payoffs. We show that a small group has strong incentives to engage in outward-looking identity strengthening, such as stereotyping or airing grievances against a specific, large outgroup, and a large group has strong incentives to engage in inward-looking identity strengthening, such as self-stereotyping, glorifying its own history, etc..
Introduction
Intergroup relationship has been a core area in social psychology and a vast literature has evolved to address questions pertinent to it. Specifically, a question frequently raised is: To what extent defining a group predicates on defining other groups. According to Brewer & Miller (1996) : "Discussion of the importance of meaningful intergroup differentiation as a determinant of social identification raises the issue of the social context within which ingroups are defined... " [w] e are what we are because they are not what we are..." But who constitutes this ambiguous "they"? Are relevant others limited to members of specific contrasting groups, or could "they" refer to all other human beings who are excluded from membership in the ingroup?... Both theory and research are ambiguous on this issue of the need for specific outgroups as a factor in ingroup identity." (pp. 47-48) In this paper we present a group-theoretic model to shed light on this question. Imagine a community populated by agents with different characteristics (both economic and non-economic). They are partitioned into exhaustive and A companion paper (Chiu & Zhong, 2011) further clarifies the material foundation to the psychological preferences introduced in this framework. It also applies the framework to study two contemporary phenomena of interest to social psychologists. The first is the declining importance of class in contemporary politics in developed economies. A widely accepted explanation is that class conflict is greatly attenuated because voters are concerned also about non-economic issues like religion, race, abortion, etc.. What remains to be explained is how the multidimensionality of preferences is determined, and to what extent it is "manufactured" by the rich. The second phenomenon is the salience of racial/ethnic conflict over class conflict in third-world countries. The pork theory, as proposed by Fearon (1999) and Caselli & Coleman II (2010) , starts with the observation that unlike other social dimensions race is the easiest to be recognized while the hardest to be changed. Thus race-based coalitions provide the strongest warranty for agents to share the "pork" ex post and hence the strongest incentive for them to grip it ex ante. Chiu & Zhong (2011) generate interesting implications consistent with these two phenomena without using the existing economic theories.
Model
Our model follows the model in Chiu & Zhong (2011) closely. Consider a community consisting of a set of agents of measure N partitioned into n exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups; without confusion, we use n , , 1  to denote these groups. We use n s s , , 1  to denote the measure of membership in each group. We assume that members in the same group have already overcome their collection action problem. As a result, we can adopt the following assumption.
Assumption 1: Each group acts as a single decision maker.
Agents produce output according to a characteristic function    v : the value of the output produced by group i when it works alone is   i v , the value of output produced jointly by group i and group j is   j i v  , etc.. The characteristic function satisfies the following standard property (see, for instance, Shapley, 1953) .
1 It can be alternatively called group solidarity or group loyalty. 2 Other major theories in intergroup bias also have the feature that an agent's psychology is useful for or enhances the agent's survival. Hewstone et al. (2002) succinctly summarize the following five major theories: social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) , optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991) , subjective uncertainty reduction (Hogg, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1993) , terror management (Solomon et al., 1991) , and social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) .
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The right-hand side (RHS) of (1) has a natural interpretation. Within a certain period of time, members in the coalition engage in pairwise matching so that each member spends an equal amount of time with every other member. For a member in group i , in particular, she will spend . This accounts for the term in the parentheses on the RHS of (1). Given i s members in group i , the RHS represents the total psychological payoffs that group i members will collectively obtain when coalition R is formed. If i R  , i.e., if group i chooses to work alone, its psychological payoffs will simply be
The way we model the utility function follows that of Alesina & La Ferrara (2000) , who study residents" decisions to contribute to a public good in a racially heterogenous community. In their model, each resident"s utility is assumed to depend on the proportion of residents of the same race as himself or herself in the whole population. Using US survey data on attitude toward redistribution, Luttmer (2001) finds that, controlling for income, individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises. Luttmer refers to this as group loyalty. We think that assuming some kind of psychological payoffs when race is concerned is a good short-cut in the modeling.
We call the n -vector i a as group i "s identity and the components of the vector as the group"s identity coefficients or amicability coefficients. Given
for any i j  , we say that group i has a stronger identity under
corresponds to the aforementioned phenomenon of homophily.) Each group"s identity coefficients are exogenously given, and our main exercise is to perform comparative statics of group welfare with respect to these coefficients. 3 Next, we assume that a group"s total payoffs equal the sum of its material payoffs and psychological payoffs.
Thus, given a coalition R , the total utility of its member groups is given by psychological payoffs are also taken into account, the formation of the grand coalition is still efficient. It is worth noticing that most research in social psychology about intergroup bias focuses on milder degree of bias (see the survey by Hewstone et al., 2002) .
Given the total utility function, we assume that each group obtains its own Shapley value taking each group as an individual player.
4 Assumption 1 justifies the treatment that each group enters the bargaining as a single decision maker. Assumption 3 implies that forming the grand coalition is indeed efficient.
More specifically, group i will obtain a total payoff of
where T is the number of groups in coalition T . There is a natural interpretation here. Imagine that groups arrive at the scene in a random order, then (2) is just group i "s weighted average of its marginal contribution to each conceivable coalition that it joins. We use   In what follows, we are interested in the effect of identity coefficients on the material payoff of groups. To this end, we study how an infinitesimal change in the former influences the latter. The change may be made possible by education, media, subtle priming, etc.. 5 One can of course go further to take into account the costs incurred to change identity coefficients. If we consider a sufficiently convex cost function, there will then be a small extent to which identity is optimally changed.
Results

A material foundation of psychology
In Chiu & Zhong (2011) , we find that a group"s material payoff (i) is increasing in its intragroup amicability, as well as the intergroup amicability towards it; (ii) is decreasing in the intragroup amicability within and intergroup amicability among other groups; and (iii) somewhat surprisingly, may be increasing in its amicability toward some outgroup. The basic idea is that, by working with outgroup members, group members will be diluting their own interactions ----as well as the interactions of outgroup members ----and their bargaining power will be strengthened or weakened dependent on the various group identities. While results (i) and (ii) are fairly intuitive, result (iii) suggests intriguing counter-intuitive spillovers between groups and is worth restating formally here (proof omitted). Presupposition has it that loving others always hurts as long as material payoff is concerned. Lemma 1 says that this presupposition is not true if the combined size of the ingroup and the outgroup being loved is sufficiently small.
Identity strengthening
The material foundation of identity discussed in the previous section suggests that an individual group does have the incentive to modify and in most cases strengthen its identity. Consider the following two ways of identity strengthening (through media, education, etc.)  Group i is said to engage in stereotyping (or outward identity strengthening) if it chooses to decrease its amicability (or increase its hostility) toward one particular out-group j , i.e., to decrease ij a for one i j  .  Group i is said to engage in self-stereotyping (or inward identity strengthening) if it chooses to increase its intragroup amicability, i.e., to increase ii a .
The self-stereotyping strategy is built by nurturing the belief among the ingroup members that their group is unique and special, without referring to specific features of any outgroup. The stereotyping strategy goes exactly the other way. It is the very peculiar feature of group j that makes members in group i think they themselves are different. Throughout the whole reasoning, the focus is outgroup j but not ingroup i . We now compare the profitability of these two alternative strategies, by examining one-unit changes in the respective identity coefficients.
The material benefit of the self-stereotyping strategy is 
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is more profitable if
where the max operator implies that the targeted outgroup is judiciously chosen. It is straightforward to obtain the following lemma (see Appendix for proofs to the lemma and the next proposition).
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions 1-3, we have
Lemma 2 means that, in terms of group i "s material payoffs, increasing ii a by one unit while holding ij a constant for all i j  is the same as decreasing ij a by one unit for all i j  while holding ii a constant.
Comparing (3) with (4), one can easily verify that (3) holds only if there exists some
positive. Put differently, a necessary condition for the outward strategy to be the optimal strategy for group i is that there exists some group k , i k  , such that group i can benefit from increasing its amicability towards it. The condition for this latter scenario was given in Lemma 1. Making use of it, we obtain the following proposition. 
Result 1.i states that, assuming 4  n , the self-stereotyping strategy dominates when group i "s size is large enough (e.g. exceeding one third when 4  n ) because the intragroup amicability now has an overwhelming weight in determining psychological payoffs. The same is true when all outgroups are symmetric in size so that no particular outgroup is important enough to be targeted towards (result 1.ii). Results 2 and 3, respectively, provide sufficient and necessary conditions, when 3  n , for the stereotyping strategy with targeted group j to dominate and to be dominated by the self-stereotyping strategy, respectively. When outgroup j is sufficiently small, the stereotyping strategy with j as the targeted group is dominated by the self-stereotyping strategy; when it is sufficiently large, the reverse is true. Result 4 gives the necessary and sufficient condition for the outward strategy to dominate the self-stereotyping strategy when there are only three groups i , j , and k . Because 3  n , there are only two terms in the RHS of (4), and the necessary condition is also the sufficient condition.
Despite a common presumption that a small group is usually the victim in an intergroup conflict, our result suggests that it need not be the case. It turns out that, in our framework, a small group has strong incentives to engage in outward-looking identity strengthening, such as stereotyping or airing grievances against a specific, large out-group, while a large group has strong incentives to engage in inward-looking identity strengthening, such as self-stereotyping and glorifying its own history. It suggests that when a large group seems to be bullying a small group, it may in fact only be a small segment of the former that is doing so. Glaeser (2005) models a small segment of the agents, called political entrepreneurs, in the majority who spread hatred against a minority.
More generally, our analysis suggests that there is generally a difference between when well-defined outgroups exist and when they do not and clarifies the conditions under which knowledge of well-defined outgroups really matters. Having a well-defined outgroup is useful for a small ingroup because it allows the ingroup to have a target for stereotyping. On the other hand, such a well-defined outgroup is not necessarily for a large ingroup because the ingroup will find it more beneficial to engage in self-stereotyping.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a framework of intergroup relationship in which agents are concerned about both material payoffs and psychological payoffs. The framework has the following feature. On the one hand, agents want to work with outgroup agents to increase their material payoffs. On the other hand, they are unwilling to do so unless they are sufficiently compensated for their losses. Hence, we are able to determine each group"s welfare as a function of its own group identity, as well as the group identities of other groups. This thus allows us to study the incentive for a group to shape its own psychological preferences.
We have compared two strategies ----one that increases the group"s amicability among members (selfstereotyping) and the other that decreases its amicability towards some judiciously chosen out-group (stereotyping). Self-stereotyping does not require specific knowledge about outgroup members, while stereotyping requires such knowledge of a specific outgroup. We find that a large group benefits more from self-stereotyping and a small group more from stereotyping. Therefore, having a well-defined outgroup is useful for a small ingroup because it allows the ingroup to have a target for stereotyping; on the other hand, such a well-defined outgroup is not necessarily for a large ingroup because the ingroup will find it more beneficial to engage in self-stereotyping.
In our analysis, we have ignored the costs of changing a group"s identity. Implicitly we assumed that the cost of strengthening intragroup amicability by one unit is just the same as the cost of decreasing intergroup amicability toward a targeted outgroup by one unit. Because of this, we could simply compare the effects of self-stereotyping and stereotyping without examining the costs. In realty, the aforementioned implicit assumption on costs does not hold in general. For instance, an ingroup may differ from outgroup 1 with a rigid boundary and from outgroup 2 with a fluid, superficial boundary. In this case, stereotyping against outgroup 1 may be easier, less costly, than stereotyping against outgroup 2. We leave these issues for future studies.
In the last two decades, economics has been learning a lot from psychology. In this paper, we have shown that, by using formal modeling that is familiar in economics but not in psychology, we can shed light on issues that interest psychologists. This is also part of the reason encouraging us to write this paper.
: ,
which is just the LHS.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
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